Zhao (2008) presents an interesting "all-or-nothing monitoring" result for a multitask moral hazard agency problem with partial e¤ort observation. We argue that the optimal contract based on the non-veri…able observation of the agent's e¤ort in Zhao (2008) can be regarded as a limitation on the incentive schemes available to the principal. We then propose some arguably more appropriate approaches for analyzing such agency problems.
In a recent paper, Rui R. Zhao (2008) studies an interesting multitask moral hazard problem with partial e¤ort observation: A principal (she) hires an agent (he) to undertake a project with several independent tasks. In addition to noisy but veri…able output signals from the agent's e¤orts, the principal can observe the agent's e¤orts in some, but not all, tasks.
1 Such direct observation, though perfect, is non-veri…able. Zhao compares the optimal output-based contract with one that is based on both the output signals and the e¤ort observation, where the principal reimburses the agent for the e¤ort cost if and only if he exerts e¤ort on the observable tasks, with such scheme being enforced by the principal's reputation concerns. Zhao …nds that the principal is strictly better o¤ by conditioning the wage scheme only on the noisy output signals, as long as she cannot perfectly observe all e¤ort choices of the agent, hence the title "all-or-nothing monitoring". The rationale behind this intriguing result is that when the principal fully compensates the agent for the e¤ort cost separately for the observable tasks, the advantageous information synergy from combining multiple independent tasks is reduced so much that she is worse o¤ compared to her wage cost in the optimal output-based contract. The all-or-nothing monitoring result is surprising, as more information does not bene…t the principal in designing the optimal contract, which contrasts with a standard result in the moral hazard literature that additional informative signals enable the principal to better address the agent's incentive problems. We show in Proposition 1 that the driving force of Zhao's result lies in the assumption of a simple wage scheme for the observable tasks. In Zhao's model, the principal is assumed to pay kc when the agent works in the k observable tasks, with this wage being enforced by reputation concerns. Reputation concerns, however, do not allow the principal to do more than this. In particular, the simple wage scheme restricts the principal from o¤ering lower wages for the k observable tasks when she observes bad output signals in the (n k) unobservable tasks, which is feasible as the agent is riskneutral. As a result, a payment scheme based on both the output signals and the perfect observation indeed generates a lower expected wage.
More speci…cally, Zhao assumes that a forcing contract on the k observable tasks plus the noisy performance bonus on the other (n k) tasks is what is available to the principal. It is, however, not obvious why one should limit oneself to this type of incentive scheme. As we demonstrate later, once one considers more general incentive schemes (in a setting where the principal's perfect observation on the k observable tasks is veri…able), the "paradox" vis-a-vis the standard result of more information being better can then be resolved.
We now present several arguably more appropriate approaches such that the e¤ect of the additional perfect observation of the agent's e¤ort in k out of n tasks can be fruitfully analyzed: First, a contract that is based on both the noisy output signals and the perfect observation can be clearly made self-enforcing if both the output signals and the observed e¤ort levels are veri…able. In that case, the principal's contract can explicitly depend on both the output signals and the observed e¤orts, and not surprisingly, more information would indeed bene…t the principal as standard theory predicts. Adopting Zhao's notation, Proposition 1 characterizes this optimal contract and compares its expected wage (denoted as E [ w ( )]) with that in the output-based contract (denoted as E [w ( )]), where w ( ) is the optimal wage in Proposition 1 in Zhao (2008) : w ( ) = nc p n q n ; if = and w ( ) = 0 if 6 = .
Proposition 1 Suppose that both the output signals and the e¤ort observation are veri…able. The principal's optimal wage scheme is to o¤er a positive wage w ( ) only if = and the agent works in all k observable tasks, where
Proof. Under veri…able output signals and e¤ort observation, the least cost contract solves:
where (LL) is the limited liability constraint, and (IC 1 ) implies that the agent prefers working in all n tasks (denoted as the e¤ort vector H) to working only in the k observable tasks (denoted as K), while (IC 2 ) ensures a non-negative expected payment for working in all n tasks. If
, which happens when the output signals are noisy and/or k is small, then only (IC 1 ) is binding and the wage scheme can be derived as:
The principal's expected wage payments under w 0 ( ) and w ( ) are
and nc P ( jH)
, respectively. Supermodularity of P ( je) then implies (or by (6) in Zhao 2 Notice that the incentive system resembles a forcing contract where the agent is punished severely (a zero wage) if he shirks in any of the observable tasks. This is feasible because of risk-neutrality. Consequently, the agent's incentives to work in the observable tasks are satis…ed.
(2008))
, which in turn yields that
(when the output signals are precise and/or k is large), then only (IC 2 ) is binding, from which, the optimal wage scheme is:
; if = 0 , otherwise :
As P ( jL) > 0, we immediately obtain that E [w ( )] > E [ w 00 ( )] = nc, which is also the lowest wage payment if the principal can perfectly observe all n e¤ort levels.
As shown in Proposition 1, the principal now employs the harshest punishment whenever she observes a shirk in an observable task -a zero wage for all 's. Moreover, if the output signals are noisy about the agent's e¤ort and/or k is small compared to n, a positive rent should be o¤ered to motivate the agent to work in all n tasks; if, however, the output signals are precise enough and/or k is large, the output signals and the perfect observation are jointly powerful enough to incentivize the agent to work in the tasks at a zero rent.
